

**TOP SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT
 War Department General Staff
 Military Intelligence Division
 Washington 25, D.C.

2-750
 T.S. Cont. #
 DL-Hq. USAF

6 Jan 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
 THE AIR FORCE

ATTN: Director of Intelligence

SUBJECT: Planning for Defense of Vital Installations

1. Reference is made to attached letter from Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, subject as above, dated 29 December 1947.

2. Request is made that the desired air intelligence and evaluation of the assumptions in subject letter be forwarded to this office for transmittal to Army Ground Forces at an early date.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

1 Incl:
 Ltr fr Hq AGF to Dir/Int,
 CSOID, Subj as above,
 29 Dec 47, w/3 Append.

s/Bruce W. Bidwell
 t/BRUCE W. BIDWELL
 Colonel, GSC
 Assistant Executive

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D.I. - Hq. USAF

Air Intelligence Division
Directorate of Intelligence

DCS/O

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Signature

Col Sturdivant

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Planning for Defense of Vital Installations

1. The Director of Intelligence, OSUSA, forwarded to DC/S, Operations, a letter from Hq, AOP, Fort Monroe, Virginia, requesting information as to the number and type of Soviet aircraft which may be capable of reaching our AEC installations and the alert time available to the Ground Forces by virtue of existing and future early warning systems; and to evaluate basic assumptions made by the Hq, AOP, that: (a) the U.S.S.R. can construct in extreme northeastern Siberia or Murmansk area a base from which 40% of the longrange aircraft available at any given time can be launched; (b) that on missions involving flights of less than 300 miles over Canadian-held or U.S. territory only 8% of total aircraft available can arrive over the target area; (c) that on missions involving flights of over 300 miles over Canadian or U.S. territory only 4% can arrive over the target area; and (d) that the Soviet's plan for B-29 type aircraft construction will include 25% transports.

2. It was estimated that the USSR had a force of 1600 operational bombers, 100 of which could be B-29 type, as of 1 Jan 1948, and that all aircraft which could be launched could reach the target areas except aborted aircraft and operational losses due to part failures, navigation difficulties, and weather. It was further stated that there is at present no aircraft early warning system but that a system is planned to be in operation by 1953.

3. In regard to the assumptions: (a) the USSR is capable of constructing bases for 40% of their available aircraft in northeastern Siberia and Murmansk area but this is not likely in view of their capability for rapidly staging aircraft through a few bases on one-way trips; (b) no information is available to substantiate the assumption of only 4% of Soviet aircraft reaching targets over 300 miles within U.S. or Canadian territory; (c) or that only 8% will reach targets less than 300 miles over U.S. or Canadian territory. A more accurate figure would be 60 to 70% of aircraft launched against installations in the U.S.; (d) the assumption that the USSR will devote 25% of its four engine aircraft production to transport aircraft is believed to be a reasonable assumption.

RECOMMENDATION

Recommend approval, signature, and forwarding.

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