Transcript of wire recording summarizing the results of a field investigation accomplished by Col. N. R. Rosengarten and Lt. J. W. Cummings on the Fort Monmouth sightings of 10 September 1951 and 11 September 1951

 

Our transcript/text version can be found at the bottom of the document section below.

 

 

Page ID (PID)	MAXW-PBB8-1531
Collection	NARA-Maxwell
Roll Description	Maxwell Blue Book 8
Document Code	N/A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Warning: As stated in handwriting on the bottom of the original page one, "This is full of errors. So use it cautiously- errors made in transcribing from wire". The author of this 16 page report is unknown at this time. Also, the original scanned images were "highlighted" later by researchers and these areas "appear" to be "blacked out" and are not. The transcriptions below reflect the full accurate text, To see the documents, click on the appropriate GIF link. Finally, there is only one page missing from this file, page 4. Numeral Page 8 appears to be missing, but is actually page 9. See  - Francis Ridge)

                                                                        16 October 1951

                    The purpose of the information recorded on this wire recording is to

          summarize results of a field investigation accomplished by Col N. H. Rosen-

          garten and Lt J. W. Cummings between the period of 28 September and 2 October

          1951.  The material recorded herein in chronological fashion although some or-

          ganization will be introduced in handling the information derived from persons

          interrogated in Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey.  The trip originated was a receipt

          at approximately 1400 at Air Technical Intelligence Center of Teletype No.

          246, Telecon Item CSAF Item 2.  This telecon was sent down from AFOIN-V/TC.

          The reported sightings on 10 September 1951 and on 11 September 1951 by

          electronic and visual means of unidentified flying objects.  Col Kirkland

          had been advised early in the morning on 28 September that Gen Cabell's office

          was desirous of knowing concerning a sighting at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey.

          Therefore, the Project Monitor of "Grudge" Project extracted from the files

          information that had been received on the Ft. Monmouth sighting and related

          same to Col Kirkland.  Now Col Kirkland made a telephone call to Washington

          and advised me to stand by that fast action would be necessary on this because

          of the General's personal interest.  Therefore, a stenographer was alerted

          since it was expected that information might be received after working hours

          were completed or to work over would be necessary to accomplish the mission

          indicated by Col Kirkland.  However, no information reached us until 4 P.M.,

          quiting time.  At that moment, Mr. Deyarmond informed that a message had come

          in that they had sought the Project Monitor and that discussion was being

          accomplished in Electronics Branch.  Consequently, Col Rosengarten and Lt

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          Cummings accompanied by Mr. Deyarmond went to the Electronics Branch and

          learned that the stated telecon had arrived some yards in length and it was

          being discussed by Electronics Branch and Mr. Zimmerman.  The decision was

          made soon after that meeting was broke up that we had been delayed already

          two hours and we might as well get into the field because information neces-

          sary for evaluation was not present in the communication from TCB, and that

          other infromation seemed likely to be had.  The decision was then submitted

          by a request in the subject telecon CSAF Item 2 as follows.  It is advisable

          to make an evaluation these of incidents recommend a full investigation to

          obtain a complete report of the incident and related circumstances. Evalua-

          tions and conclusions should be forwared to this Hq by teleconference.  Im-

          mediate investigation must be made.  Findings must be related immediately to

          this Hq not later than Monday, 1 October 1951, following information concerning

          these instances is quoted for preliminary analysis to be made immediately for

          Gen Cabell and then EADS, Hq, Stewart Air Force Base interrogations concerning

          radar and visual sightings are quoted.  Now Col Kirkland was contacted and

          travel orders were written at a late hour in the evening so that Col Rosen-

          garten and Lt Cummings boarded a TWA airplane for New York at about 11:30

          that night.  About 10 o'clock on Saturday morning Lt Cummings and Col Rosengarten

          reached Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, and contacted their G-2 of the Signal Corps

          station, Ft. Monmouth.  Arrangements were made to begin immediate interrogation

          of personnel concerning electronics sightings through the cooperation of G-2,

          Base Commander, acting through Col Murnmunro.  The persons interrogated are as

          follows:  PFC Clark, Pvt, Abelle, Pvt Allen, Pvt Mason, Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Meyer,

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          Capt McNicholas; Dr. Bennett; Col Murnmunro; Agent Deborn; Agent and Chief

          Reed, both of G-2; and consequently, Lt Rogers and Major Ballard of Dover

          Air Force Base, pilots concerned; Major Markin, Commanding Technical Officer

          of Twin Light Radar Station; Staff Sgt Pallot, Monitor radar box channel, Twin

          Lights Radio Station; and incidental individuals.  Reference to basic CFAS,

          Item No. 2 of the telecon of 28 September 1951 will show the names of Clark,

          Abelle, Mason, and Myer.  These individuals were concerned with operations of

          radar stations from which signals were seen on 10 and 11 September.  Now the

          significant fact learned at Fort Monmouth was that the students were operating

          radar sets in a training center that these students were not connected with

          practical operations.  They maintained no plotting records and they did not

          plot and did not log any of their findings.  Circumstances were basically

          that as students who were being trained in maintenance at this training faci-

          lity and that an instructor put certain mechanical or electronic difficulties

          into radar sets of the SCR 584-A Type.  The students were charged with deter-

          mining the malfunction causes and eliminating these causes.  If the students

          were successful in eliminating the causes and peaking their set to higher

          radiation efficiences, early in their phase of the program associated with

          these sets, they were permitted to operate the sets much the same as a tactical

          operation for the balance of the period to which they were assigned to a parti-

          cular set.  This is an important item in connection with the following interro-

          gations in that three students were assigned to each set and these three students

          were required to operate alone, not providing a man for allowing or coordinating

          by plots.  It was considered incidentally desirable by the students to operate

          the sets as a sort of privilege and they attempted to do this whenever possible.

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          in preparation for becoming an instructor at Fort Monmouth where he is actually

          functioning in that capacity now.  PFC Crop (Clark) was operating an MPG type set

          MPG-1 and consequently his information and that of Mr. Meyer's are somewhat

          more reliable scope than that of the students.  No purpose seems to be served

          in detailing the results of the interrogations of these men but rather we will

          go at once to the items of CSAF Item No. 2 in order to discuss the influences of

          the interrrogations on the material presented in these items are the basic

          teleconference telecon Item No. 1, September 10, 1951, ******., PG-1 radar

          set picked up a fast moving low flying target, etc.  This is under the auspices

          under the operation of PFC Clark at that time.  PFC Clark was operating the set

          unattended at that time.  This set has nominal range of 12 to 14,000 yds., the

          set is zeroed in azimuth using a compass on stakes so that 0 degrees for a set in

          azimuth is magnetic north field approximately with experimental error of the

          situation may set it upon.  PFC Clark was making a demonstration for some

          visiting non-technical officers at the time he observed Item No. 1.  It was

          his intention to obtain a target to lock the target in on automatic semi-aided

          tracking and to demonstrate this feature as such, he is successful almost as

          soon as he started the demonstration of finding a saturation echo on a PPI scope

          with almost constant target heading, on attempting to lock in a aided tracking

          However, he was considerably flustrated by the fact that the aided tracking

          would not keep up with the object.  After several attempts to maintain aided

          tracking of this target, he determined that the speed was too high for aided

          tracking of about 700/mph.  Because of the circumstances of the demonstration

          quickly tried to pass to another target and was finally successful in demon-

          strating a ground target, namely, the Highlands which lie between the station

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          and New York City.  Interrogator regarded anomalous propagation involving

          trapping effects and gave negative indications and was verified by other

          personnel.  Weather shows that September 10 in that area was not one favoring

          anomalous propagation but the September 11 was.  We have indications evidenced

          by PFC Clark was that ground quarter was of a normal nature and was not ex-

          tending inside of 5,000 yds. prior 3 centimeters set of the MPG type or others were

          in operation in the area at that station to the knowledge PFC Clark and other

          personnel there which eliminates interference effects.  Note that no pit

          shape may be discussed here in order to fix the current size of target because

          Clark began operation on this instance at approximately 11:15 and the operation

          was ended by 11:18 approximately.  This is EDST.  Maximum duration of sighting

          approximately 3 seconds at one time although 45 seconds in a row.  It could

          not be verified 10 September 1951 was fixed in the telecon, however, the student

          with reference to other events would fix this as 11 September or 12 September.

          This is given a low evaluation.  It is believed, in fact it was on September 10.

          The MPG set had been in operation since 1100, that is warming up, for 15 minutes

          before the demonstration began in which the target was picked.  This story

          interrogation by PFC Clark was high asimuth rate target traveling north bound

          up the Jersey course from Belmont.  It was lost near Sandy Hook, he said.

          Following the course line changing the range only slightly but changing asimuth

          rapidly.  The target was lost in the northeast at a range of 14,000 yds.  Opera-

          tor initially identified the target as a ship and then realized it could not be

          a ship.  PFC Clark upon interrogation stated that he intended to say operator

          found a target near location of ship is usually found and realized it was not

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          a ship.  Now finding on reinterrogation of PFC Clark independent of the pre-

          viously accomplished one indicated azimuth variation from 315 to 205 degrees, remember

          this is magnetic.  Notice that the stories are radically different, and it is

          the opinion that consequence of firm statements by PFC Clark, one must conclude

          that the track is not that specified by CSAF Item No. 2 nor are they the tract

          which begins at a heading of about 315 magnetic and changes continously to

          about 205 magnetic.  This would put the track very similar to that of the object

          observed by Major Ballard and Lt Rogers, airborne at about that time.  There is

          no more significant information to report of CSAF Item 2, subparagraph 1.

                    Reference paragraph 2 stating on 10 September 1951, 1515 hours ANSCR 584

          T-33 shortly before track-target, etc.  It is given an A-1 evaluation that

          this target was a balloon.  It was tracked at the request of the Commanding

          Officer of the Student Attachment to determine the altitude in order to es-

          tablish who won a pool concerning what the altitude of the balloon which is

          sighted might be.  The pool was formed by several officers at a risk of $1 a

          head concerning this target.  It is a significant feature here which ties in later

          with the discussion of balloons.  So much for Item 2, Paragraph 2.

                    Paragraph 3.  On 11 September 1951 at 1050 hours, two SCR 584 Serial sets

          217 and 315 picked up the same target north of Ft. Monmouth at an elevation

          350 to 300 mils range of 30,000 yds., etc.  The interesting part of this

          sighting is that it was inspired by alert which was traced to newspapers.  It

          involves further Mr. Meyer the instructor previously mentioned and Pvt Mason,

          the MIT graduate, previously mentioned.  Pvt Mason and a crew of two other

          men were training in a radar set which was in operation at the particular moment

          just prior to the signal received at 1050 hours.  The instructor, Mr. Meyer, was

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          advised that he should put all sets into watch in the search in order to

          watch for unidentified flying objects.  In order to do this, he had another

          instructor point out directly to his students and advise them that they should

          search at once for unidentified flying objects.  Pvt Mason and the other two men

          were among the students who were notified.  Another instructor went directly to SCR

          584 set No. 217 put it on the air.  It had previously been warmed up that morning.

          Almost at once Pvt Mason and his crew announced to Mr. Meyer that they had a

          target high speed and strong.  Mr. Meyer investigated and observed the target

          himself on the scope, noticed the azimuth and went directly to set 217 searched

          in the proper azimuth for the same target and soon succeeded in finding it.

          Indication of a target of greater than B-25 size generally of the B-29 size

          interrupted distinguished from a B-36 size aircraft.  Mr. Meyer had personally

          tracked on several occasions and could distinguish, he said, from a balloon

          stating that it was definitely not a balloon he had in the scope.  Target

          first appeared at zero degrees azimuth and varied 250 to 50 azimuth.  During turns

          the pip would diminish in the manner which was characteristic of jet aircraft

          at that range.  He put the scope on tracking because they would keep the

          target in aided tracking by assisting the operation by applying torgue to

          the hand wheel.  G-2 Coachmayer whose age is 31, is at least a B reliability.

          He is cleared for Secret, however, other weather information showed existance of

          fronts lying out from Fort Monmouth in such a nature with the radar load pro-

          jecting downwards would give signals somewhat like the type observed.  It is

          not an evaluation.  There is not sufficient data from which to make an evaluation.

          Only the indications are given here.  Very little sensible information could be

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          solicited from Pvt mason and his crew due to the difficulties of time having

          elapsed and the student's being confused by their training program, speaking

          specifically of a rigid detail and routine to which they are subjected.  This

          should not be construed to be a criticism in that their technical capabilities

          seem to be unusually great for students showing that their training courses is

          likely a very good one.  Notice that paragraph 3 of basic communication includes

          two unrelated reports.  Pvt Mason and his crew are identified with No. 4, SCR

          Serial No. 315.  Mr. Meyer identified with this Serial No. 217, Item 3.  Now

          it is proper to discuss SCR Set Serial No. 315 of Item 3 identifying this was

          Pvt Allen and his crew.  Pvt Allen, Pvt Abello of this crew were interrogated.

          It developed that Pvt Allen was operating the set alone at the time he picked

          up the signal.  He did not relate the information that morning to his fellow

          students but rather waited until that afternoon.  Although they were within

          easy hearing distance at the time he identified the target on the scope, the

          situation is too confused again in this instance to state specifically any

          findings.  It may be concluded, however, that weather could have had a definite

          effect upon this target as well.  Some questions may be introduced concerning why

          Pvt Allen would fail immediately to notify his fellow member of such an unusual

          target had he seen it and indeed not mention it during the lunch but wait until

          that afternoon late in order to reveal it.  It is not to be construed as an

          evaluation again.  There is not sufficient data to arrive at a conclusion.  The

          time to be ascribed to paragraph 3 should be approximately 1037 EDST.  Interro-

          gation of the student personnel occupied Saturday, Saturday night, and Sunday

          morning and part of Sunday afternoon.  Much time was spent attempting to fix

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          with greater detail dates, time, and circumstances in order to find something

          of value.  However, it was realized after all this was accomplished, it had (been)

          in vain, absolutely too much time had elapsed for human memory to recover the

          detail necessary for further evaluaton.  Then, the two pilots, Major Ballard

          flying as observer, and Lt Rogers who was flying as pilot of a T-33, sighted

          an unidentified flying object and they flew into Fort Monmouth for interrogation.

          The story was verified, questioned, analyzed, discussed, and the pilots remained

          firmly convinced of the details which they had sighted.  However, certain cir-

          cumstances were indications that they did not possess the detail which they

          claimed concerning a track of the flying object they claimed to have seen.  They

          were interrogated at great length concerning the circumstances whereby this

          report concerning the flying object they saw reached the press and also a

          request was xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx signed for investigation of the base PIO

          officer at Mitchell Air Force Base, a Major Barron, in order to clarify his

          part in the activity.  It is sufficient to state that neither Ballard or Rogers

          made a voluntary statement to press and that Rogers made his statement to the

          press only when he was directed to do so by Major Barron, Base PIO, and this

          is according to Rogers statement only.  An interrogation of the personnel at

          Twin Lights Radar Station was undertaken and it was learned that Twin Lights

          was off the air at the time the sightings occurred on 10 September.  Visual

          and radar sightings are referred to in this instance.  Operating hours at

          that time at Twin Lights were 0400 to 0800 and 1730 to 2330 EDST.  Therefore,

          there is no verification from Twin Lights loss of the sighting one way or

          the other.  However, Staff Sgt Pallock who was monitoring channel fox at the

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          station overheard a radio check and communications between the pilots which is

          discussed in detail in other reports inclosed in the folder.  He reports

          that the conversation was an excited one and verified roughly the statements

          Rogers and Ballard made concerning what they revealed over the air.  He fixed

          the time as only about 11:45 EDST and could not fix the date.  Pallock is

          evaluated "A" by his personnel.  He is cleared for secret.  Dr. Bennett was

          queried concerning possible activities of a countermeasure station in which

          he works which might have an effect of giving spurious signals to radar sets

          operating in the area.  His answer to these proposals were unqualified

          negative.  He was interrogated by Col Rosengarten and his report is filed in

          the project folder.  Mr. Hoffman, Capt McNicholas, Agent DeBorn, Agent-in-

          Chief Reid, were all interrogated concerning the circumstances of alerts which were

          given student operators at that station.  Mr. Taylor is not recorded here as

          available in the project's record folder.  Major Martin is Commanding Officer

          of Twin Lights and gave the information of the hours of which the station was

          on the air.  With some seven hours of sleep, and one or two meals, the infield

          party, that is Col Rosengarten and Lt Cummings chartered an airplane at Red-

          banks Airport for Washington, D. C. at approximately 1:30 P.M. reaching Wash-

          ington at approximately 3:30 P.M. in time to brief Gen. Gabell's staff and to

          give a very preliminary rundown of what had been accomplished to Gen. Gabell

          himself that evening.  The airplane was chartered because although the Signal

          Corps attempt to use their liaison airplane to take us to Washington, the

          liaison airplane was torn down for periodic inspection.  It would have been

          necessary to wait until the next day had rail or other transportation been

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          relied upon.  Work continued in Washington and Gen. Cabell wanted to be

          brief on Tuesday in detail.  We checked with Col. Kirkland and learned

          that he wished us to leave behind in Washington as short and incomplete

          a record as possible pending our firm commitment to Washington as a power of

          center commitment at  a later date after we had the opportunity to study the

          data in detail.  This we were successful in accomplishing.  We did have the (work)

          in Washington on Tuesday morning and afternoon in order to determine the

          possibility for balloon and experimental aircraft situations as the incident

          reported.  Balloon results were, until after we left Washington, negative as

          were experimental aircraft possibilities.  Agencies contacted with this respect

         were Gen Mills, a Mr. Dalein in Minneapolis, Minn., a Mrs. Wheaden of the

          Signal Corps Research Development Center in the Pentagon, Dr. Jack Holloway,

          and Dr. Lydel of the Office of Naval Research, Major Vickbena of Mobey Dick

          Project in the Pentagon, and others incidental in discovering the identity

          of these project monitors.  The weather bureau was contacted for the weather

          report.  Command Post personnel were contacted to determine whether any reports

          from the Eastern Air Defense Command might have reported any sightings which

          we did not have.  These results were negative.  Persons contacted include:

          Col Lambert, Eastern Air Defense Command, AC&W Officer, at the Pentagon; Col

          Corry, Command Post Commanding Officer; Lt Col Hubber, Command Post Deputy; and per-

          sonnel in the message centers.  The following conclusions were left with Gen

          Gabell's staff, Hartford and Bait, and qualified to them as particularly pre-

          liminary conclusions.  Reference to the telecon message again CSAF Item 2,

          paragraph 1, we have nothing to the moment.  We are attempting to get more

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          basic information which applies possibly in with the airborne sighting.

          Paragraph No. 2 (a)  1 balloon because:

                    a.  Constant altitude.

                    b.  Slow variation in azimuth.

                    c.  Visual observation about the same time at the same altitude

          by a group of officers.

                    d.  Motive as to the cause for search for that balloon was estab-

          lished as an order from the Commanding Officer of the student attachment.

                    e.  Pip size checks with balloons.

                3.  Target echoes as described bear the characteristics which closely

          resemble aircraft.  It is based on what we have now.  We can't add anything

          negative.  Although it resembles an aircraft, it is not impossible that it

          is caused by weather phenomena.  It is of bleak waves.

                 4.  Weather possibility exists as follows:

                     a.  Stationary target when first detected giving rapid altitude

          change offers us one solution that fits.

                     b.  It is to be qualified, however, that weather is not as plausible

          an explanation of a track of 10,000 yds. continuously at 700/mph over south

          to 32,000 yds. range.  It is to be mentioned however, that more accurate

          experienced observations than those of the students would be required to

          identify any points of similarity to the actual appearance of aircraft return.

          Students were able to yield primarily only information concerning the motions

          of the pip.  However, as most preliminary conclusions offered this staff, the

          airborne sighting of 1st lt Rogers and Major Ballard follows:

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                   There are counter-indications that it is an attempt by these two offi-

          cers to gain publicity in that transmission by the pilot to Samsworth were

          monitored by Twin Lights and it was definitely reported by the monitor that

          the pilots were excited in describing something which they believed to exist

          from the sound of their voices.  A ground track was established by reference

          to interrogation a chart made by airborne by Lt Rogers.  It is believed that

          the ground chart which he recorded on that map is correct as the pilots

          consider it.  No statement was made as to whether the pilots are correct

          but only as they consider it.  The range involved cross-section by observation

          from greater altitude against geographic points on the ground.  Upper limited

          range could thereby be established.  A size was reported 30 to 50 ft. in

          diameter is not fixed or reliable value.  Lt Rogers will admit a larger size even

          up to B-17 dimensions.  As to speed, Rogers and Ballard would not fix a value.

          They quote only their ground track against the sighting time that is 30 to 50

          nautical miles in about two minutes.  This shape oblate spheriod the color

          silver.  There were no more observations which we could offer the staff.  At

          the time of this recording, conclusions are something as follows:  From the

          interrogation of Lt Rogers, the T-33 pilot, (a) the subject was circular in

          shape changing after banking to elliptical.  Conclusion:  Oblique speriod in

          shape the object bank in turning.  (B)  The object was silver in color.  Pilot

          was firm that the object did not reflect the sunlight brightly.  (c)  The object

          covered 35 to 50 miles during a two minute period of observation.  Conclusion:

          That with an allowance for misinterpretation, the object makes good speeds greater

          than 700/mph.  (d) The object cannot be fixed for size except within the lower

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          bound of 35 ft diameter and upper bound of  B-17 diameter.  (e) The time of

          sighting was 11:35 EDST and the object was lost at 11:37 EDST, on 10 September

          1951.  However all the foregoing observations concerning the conclusion from

          the interrogation of Lt Rogers are in the assumption that it is impossible to

          demonstrate this criteria necessary to establish their sighting as one of a

          balloon.  Now these critiria are considered to be something like the following:

                    a.  Opportunity - that is the presence of a balloon in that

          geographic area.

                    b.  Similarity - that is points of similarity between balloons and

          observations made.

                    c.  Absence of a negative component - that is, the pilots themselves

          verified as a balloon or the subjects who were viewing from the ground did not

          see a balloon or did see a balloon.  However, this could be elaborated upon.

          It is believed that essentially that these factors would effect the decision.

          Now as to opportunity, we have information that the Evans Signal Laboratory

          released two ballons at 11:12 EDST 10 September, that these balloons were in

          the air until 12:31 EDST on 10 September and that they burst at 104,000 ft.

          and the diameter of the balloons at burst were 39 ft approximately.  It is

          to be noticed that Evans Signal Laboratory is located at Belmar, N. J.  It

          is considered that opportunity is presented in the time element and in geograph

          locations regarding points of similarity the following must be considered:

                     Considering that the pilots disagreed radically, interrogations of A-2 of

          EADF and interrogations by ATIC personnel as in their written statements con-

          cerning ground tract that they are not sure of more than this fact that the

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          object was always on their left and that they did not or did assume a parallel

          heading.  Mathematically speaking, this is to say that the object was going in

          the same direction as the T-33 aircraft was turning and that the object is following

          a course such that it is always leading the aircraft, that is, out of phase with

          it, or that the object is traveling in phase inside the circle of the aircraft

          and indeed that if may even be stationary inside the circle of the aircraft.

          It is to be noted that the interpretation that the object always lay on the left

          of the pilot may be that the object was a balloon stationary inside their turning

          circle.  It is also to be noted that the pilots are sufficiently sure of

          the ground track to negate this and a calculation concerning what the altitude

          of a balloon must be are unnecessary and impossible in that the accuracy of the

          pilot's report is an extremely questionable thing.  In fact, there is indication

          that they cannot fix the alleged ground tract of the object within 10 nautical

          miles.  Note that in terms of speed, this means ten nautical miles in two minutes

          or five nautical miles per minute or 300 knots per hour if one  takes the extreme

          error between the two observations of ground tract.  A point of similarity is

          that balloons are silvery painted for radar purposes when released from Evans

          Signal Laboratory.  So recon was reported by the pilot.  A point of similarity

          is the shape viewed under proper circumstances that the balloon might have an

          oblique spheriodal shape.  In the light of this information, it is considered

          that there is a strong possibility that the sighting was that of a balloon.  How-

          ever, if it can be disproved without recourse to metaphysics that the object was

          a balloon, then it should be considered that the four conclusions presented pre-