Case 3. Haneda Air Force Base, Japan, August 5-6, 1952. Brief summary: USAF
tower operators at Haneda AFB observed an unusually bright bluish-white
light to their NE, alerted the GCI radar unit at Shiroi, which then
called for a scramble of an F94 interceptor after getting radar returns
in same general area. GCI ground radar vectored the F94 to an orbiting
unknown target, which the F94 picked up on its airborne radar. The
target then accelerated out of the F94's radar range after 90 seconds
of pursuit that was followed also on the Shiroi GCI radar.
1. Introduction:
The visual and radar
sightings at Haneda AFB, Japan, on August 5-6, 1952, represent an
example of a long-puzzling case, still carried as an unidentified case
by Project Bluebook, at my latest check, and chosen for analysis in the
Condon Report. In the latter, is putatively explained in terms of a
combination of diffraction and mirage distortion of the star Capella,
as far as the visual parts are concerned, while the radar portions are
attributed to anomalous propagation. I find very serious difficulties
with those "explanations" and regard them as typical of a number of
rather casually advanced explanations of long-standing UFO cases that
appear in the Condon Report. Because this case has been discussed in
such books as those of Ruppelt, Keyhoe, and Hall, it is of particular
interest to carefully examine case-details on it and then to examine
the basis of the Condon Report's explanation of it, as example of how
the Condon Report disposed of old "classic cases."
Haneda AFB, active
during the Korean War, lay about midway between central Tokyo and
central Yokohama, adjacent to Tokyo International Airport. The 1952 UFO
incident began with visual sightings of a brilliant object in the
northeastern sky, as seen by two control tower operators going on duty
at 2330 LST (all times hereafter will be LST). It will serve brevity to
introduce some coded name designations for these men and for several
officers involved, since neither the Condon Report, nor my copies of
the original Bluebook case-file show names (excised from latter copies
in accordance with Bluebook practice on non-release of witness names in
UFO cases):
Coded Designation Identification Airman A One of
two Haneda tower operators who first sighted light; rank was A/3c.
Airman B Second
Haneda tower operator to first sight light; A/1c.
Lt. A Controller
on duty at Shiroi GCI unit up to 2400, August 5; 1st Lt.
Lt. B Controller
at Shiroi after 0000, August 6; 1st Lt.
Lt. P Pilot of
scrambled F-94; 1st Lt.
Lt. R Radar
officer in F-94; 1st Lt.
Shiroi GCI Station, manned by the 528th AC&W (Aircraft Control and Warning) Group, lay approximately 20 miles NE of Haneda (specifically at 35 deg. 49' N, 140 deg. 2' E) and had a CPS-1 10-cm search radar plus a CPS 10- cm height-finding radar. Two other USAF facilities figure in the incident, Tachikawa AFB, lying just over 20 miles WNW of Haneda, and Johnson AFB, almost 30 miles NW of Waneda. The main radar incidents center over the north extremity of Tokyo Bay, roughly midway from central Tokyo to Chiba across the Bay. The Bluebook case-file
on this incident contains 25 pages, and since the incident predates
promulgation of AFR200-2, the strictures on time-reporting, etc., are
not here so bothersome as in the Lakenheath case of 1956, discussed
above. Nevertheless, the same kind of disturbing internal
inconsistencies are present here as one finds in most Bluebook case
reports; in particular, there is a bothersome variation in times given
for specific events in different portions of the case-file. One of
these, stressed in the Condon Report, will be discussed explicitly
below; but for the rest, I shall use those times which appear to yield
the greatest over-all internal consistency. This will introduce no
serious errors, since the uncertainties are mostly only 1 or 2 minutes
and, except for the cited instance, do not alter any important
implications regardless of which cited time is used. The over-all
duration of the visual and radar sightings is about 50 minutes. The
items of main interest occurred between 2330 and 0020, approximately.
Although this case
involves both visual and radar observations of unidentified objects,
careful examination does not support the view that the same object was
ever assuredly seen visually and on radar at the same time, with the
possible exception of the very first radar detection just after 2330.
Thus it is not a "radar-visual" case, in the more significant sense of
concurrent two-channel observations of an unknown object. This point
will be discussed further in Section 5.
2. Visual Observations:
a. First visual
detection. At 2330, Airmen A and B, while walking across the ramp at
Haneda AFB to go on the midnight shift at the airfield control tower,
noticed an "exceptionally bright light" in their northeastern sky. They
went immediately to the control tower to alert two other on-duty
controllers to it and to examine it more carefully with the aid of the
7x50 binoculars available in the tower. The Bluebook case-file notes
that the two controllers already on tower-duty "had not previously
noticed it because the operating load had been keeping their attention
elsewhere. "
b. Independent visual
detection at Tachikawa AFB. About ten minutes later, according to the
August 12, 1952, Air Intelligence Information Report (IR-35-52) in the
Bluebook case-file; Haneda was queried about an unusually bright light
by controllers at Tachikawa AFB, 21 miles to their WNW. IR-35-52
states: "The control tower at Tachikawa Air Force Base called Haneda
tower at approximately 2350 to bring their attention to a brilliant
white light over Tokyo Bay. The tower replied that it had been in view
for some time and that it was being checked."
This feature of the
report is significant in two respects: 1) It indicates that the
luminous source was of sufficiently unusual brilliance to cause two
separate groups of Air Force controllers at two airfields to respond
independently and to take alert-actions; and 2) More significantly, the
fact that the Tachikawa controllers saw the source in a direction "over
Tokyo Bay" implies a line-of-sight distinctly south of east. From
Tachikawa, even the north end of the Bay lies to the ESE. Thus the
intersection of the two lines of sight fell somewhere in the northern
half of the Bay, it would appear. As will be seen later, this is where
the most significant parts of the radar tracking occurred subsequently.
c. Direction,
intensity, and configuration of the luminous source. IR-35-52 contains
a signed statement by Air man A, a sketch of the way the luminous
source looked through 7-power binoculars, and summary comments by Capt.
Charle"s J. Malven, the FEAF intelligence officer preparing the report
for transmission to Bluebook.
Airman A's own
statement gives the bearing of the source as NNE; Malven summary
specifies only NE. Presumably the witness' statement is the more
reliable, and it also seems to be given a greater degree of precision,
whence a line-of-sight azimuth somewhere in the range of 25 to 35 deg.
east of north appears to be involved in the Haneda sightings. By
contrast, the Tachikawa sighting-azimuth was in excess of 90 deg. from
north, and probably beyond 100 deg., considering the geography
involved, a point I shall return to later.
Several different
items in the report indicate the high _intensity_ of the source. Airman
A's signed statement refers to it as "the intense bright light over the
Bay." The annotated sketch speaks of "constant brilliance across the
entire area" of the (extended) source, and remarks on "the blinding
effect from the brilliant light." Malven's summary even points out that
"Observers stated that their eyes would fatigue rapidly when they
attempted to concentrate their vision on the object," and elsewhere
speaks of "the brilliant blue-white light of the object." Most of these
indications of brightness are omitted from the Condon Report, yet bear
on the Capella hypothesis in terms of which that Report seeks to
dispose of these visual sightings.
Airman A's filed
statement includes the remark that "I know it wasn't a star, weather
balloon or venus, because I compared it with all three." This calls for
two comments. First, Venus is referred to elsewhere in the case-file,
but this is certainly a matter of confusion, inasmuch as Venus had set
that night before about 2000 LST. Since elsewhere in the report
reference is made to Venus lying in the East, and since the only
noticeable celestial object in that sector at that time would have been
Jupiter, I would infer that where "Venus" is cited in the case-file,
one should read "Jupiter." Jupiter would have risen near 2300, almost
due east, with apparent magnitude -2.0. Thus Airman A's assertion that
the object was brighter than "Venus" may probably be taken to imply
something of the order of magnitude -3.0 or brighter. Indeed, since it
is most unlikely that any observer would speak of a -3.0 magnitude
source as "blinding" or "fatiguing" to look at, I would suggest that
the actual luminosity, at its periods of peak value (see below) must
have exceeded even magnitude -3 by a substantial margin.
Airman A's allusion to
the intensity as compared with a "weather balloon" refers to the
comparisons (elaborated below) with the light suspended from a pilot
balloon released near the tower at 2400 that night and observed by the
tower controllers to scale the size and brightness. This is a very
fortunate scaling comparison, because the small battery-operated lights
long used in meteorological practice have a known luminosity of about
1.5 candle. Since a 1-candle source at 1 kilometer yields apparent
magnitude 0.8, inverse-square scaling for the here known balloon
distance of 2000 feet (see below) implies an apparent magnitude of
about -0.5 for the balloon-light as viewed at time of launch. Capt.
Malven's summary states, in discussing this quite helpful comparison,
"The balloon's light was described as extremely dim and yellow, when
compared to the brilliant blue white light of the object." Here again,
I believe one can safely infer an apparent luminosity of the object
well beyond Jupiter's -2.0. Thus, we have here a number of compatible
indications of apparent brightness well beyond that of any star, which
will later be seen to contradict explanations proposed in the Condon
Report for the visual portions of the Haneda sightings.
Of further interest
relative to any stellar source hypothesis are the descriptions of the
_configuration_ of the object as seen with 7-power binoculars from the
Haneda tower, and its approximate _angular diameter_. Fortunately, the
latter seems to have been adjudged in direct comparison with an object
of determinate angular subtense that was in view in the middle of the
roughly 50-minute sighting. At 2400, a small weather balloon was
released from a point at a known distance of 2000 ft from the control
tower. Its diameter at release was approximately 24 inches. (IR-35-52
refers to it as a "ceiling balloon", but the cloud-cover data contained
therein is such that no ceiling balloon would have been called for.
Furthermore, the specified balloon mass, 30 grams, and diameter, 2 ft,
are precisely those of a standard pilot balloon for upper-wind
measurement. And finally, the time [2400 LST = 1500Z] was the standard
time for a pilot balloon run, back in that period.) A balloon of 2-ft
diameter at 2000-ft range would subtend 1 milliradian, or just over 3
minutes of arc, and this was used by the tower observers to scale the
apparent angular subtense of the luminous source. As IR-35-52 puts it:
"Three of the operators indicated the size of the light, when closest
to the tower, was approximately the same as the small ceiling balloons
(30 grams, appearing 24 inches in diameter) when launched from the
weather station, located at about 2000 ft from the tower. This would
make the size of the central light about 50 ft in diameter, when at the
10 miles distance tracked by GCI.... A lighted weather balloon was
launched at 2400 hours..." Thus, it would appear that an apparent
angular subtense close to 3 minutes of arc is a reasonably reliable
estimate for the light as seen by naked eye from Haneda. This is almost
twice the average resolution-limit of the human eye, quite large enough
to match the reported impressions that it had discernible extent, i.e.,
was not merely a point source.
But the latter is very
much more clearly spelled out, in any event, for IR-35-52 gives a
fairly detailed description of the object's appearance through 7-power
binoculars. It is to be noted that, if the naked-eye diameter were
about 3 minutes, its apparent subtense when viewed through
7X-binoculars would be about 20 minutes, or two-thirds the naked-eye
angular diameter of the full moon -- quite large enough to permit
recognition of the finer details cited in IR-35-52, as follows: "The
light was described as circular in shape, with brilliance appearing to
be constant across the face. The light appeared to be a portion of a
large round dark shape which was about four times the diameter of the
light. When the object was close enough for details to be seen, a
smaller, less brilliant light could be seen at the lower left hand
edge, with two or three more dim lights running in a curved line along
the rest of the lower edge of the dark shape. Only the lower portion of
the darker shape could be determined, due to the lighter sky which was
believed to have blended with the upper side of the object. No rotation
was noticed. No sound was heard."
Keeping in mind that
those details are, in effect, described for an image corresponding in
apparent angular size to over half a lunar diameter, the detail is by
no means beyond the undiscernible limit. The sketch included with
IR-35-52 matches the foregoing description, indicating a central disc
of "constant brilliance across entire area (not due to a point source
of light)", an annular dark area of overall diameter 3-4 times that of
the central luminary, and having four distinct lights on the lower
periphery, "light at lower left, small and fairly bright, other lights
dimmer and possibly smaller." Finally, supportive comment thereon is
contained in the signed statement of Airman A. He comments: "After we
got in the tower I started looking at it with binoculars, which made
the object much clearer. Around the bright white light in the middle,
there was a darker object which stood out against the sky, having
little white lights along the outer edge, and a glare around the whole
thing."
All of these
configurational details, like the indications of a quite un- starlike
brilliance, will be seen below to be almost entirely unexplainable on
the Capella hypothesis with which the Condon Report seeks to settle the
Haneda visual sightings. Further questions ultimately arise from
examination of reported apparent motions of the luminous source, which
will be considered next.
d. Reported
descriptions of apparent motions of the luminous source. Here we meet
the single most important ambiguity in the Haneda case-file, though the
weight of the evidence indicates that the luminous object exhibited
definite movements. The ambiguity arises chiefly from the way Capt.
Malven summarized the matter in his IR-35-52 report a week after the
incident; "The object faded twice to the East, then returned. Observers
were uncertain whether disappearance was due to a dimming of the
lights, rotation of object, or to the object moving away at terrific
speed, since at times of fading the object was difficult to follow
closely, except as a 3mall light, ObserverC did agree that when close,
the object did appear
In contrast to the
above form in which Malven summarized the reported motions, the way
Airman A described them in his own statement seems to refer to distinct
motions, including transverse components: "I watched it disappear twice
through the glasses. It seemed to travel to the East and gaining
altitude at a very fast speed, much faster than any jet. Every time it
disappeared it returned again, except for the last time when the jets
were around. It seemed to know they were there. As for an estimate of
the size of the object -- I couldn't even guess." Recalling that
elsewhere in that same signed statement this tower controller had given
the observed direction to the object as NNE, his specification that the
object "seemed to travel to the East" seems quite clearly to imply a
non radial motion, since, if only an impression of the latter were
involved, one would presume he would have spoken of it in some such
terms as "climbing out rapidly to the NNE". Since greater weight is
presumably to be placed on direct-witness testimony than on another's
summary thereof, it appears necessary to assume that not mere radial
recession but also transverse components of recession. upwards and
towards the East, were observed.
That the luminous
source varied substantially in angular subtense is made very clear at
several points in the case-file: One passage already cited discusses
the "size of the light, when closest to the tower...", while, by
contrast, another says that: "At the greatest distance, the size of the
light appeared slightly larger than Venus, approximately due East of
Haneda, and slightly brighter." (For "Venus" read "Jupiter" as noted
above. Jupiter was then near quadrature with angular diameter of around
40 seconds of arc. Since the naked eye is a poor judge of comparative
angular diameters that far below the resolution limit, little more can
safely be read into that statement than the conclusion that the
object's luminous disc diminished quite noticeably and its apparent
brightness fell to a level comparable to or a bit greater than
Jupiter's when at greatest perceived distance. By virtue of the latter,
it should be noted, one has another basis for concluding that when at
peak brilliance it must have been considerably brighter than Jupiter's
-2.0, a conclusion already reached by other arguments above.
In addition to
exhibiting what seems to imply recession, eastward motion, and climb to
disappearance, the source also disappeared for at least one other
period far too long to be attributed to any scintillation or other such
meteorological optical effect: "When we were about half way across the
ramp (Airman A stated), it disappeared for the first time and returned
to approximately the same spot about 15 seconds later." There were
scattered clouds over Haneda at around 15-16,000 ft, and a very few
isolated clouds lower down, yet it was full moon that night and, if
patches of clouds had drifted very near the controllers' line-of-sight
to the object, they could be expected to have seen the clouds. (The
upper deck was evidently thin, for Capt. Malven notes in his report
that "The F94 crew reported exceptional visibility and stated that the
upper cloud layer did not appreciably affect the brilliancy of the
moonlight.") A thin cloud interposed between observer and a distant
luminous source would yield an impression of dimming and enhanced
effective angular diameter, not dimming and reduced apparent size, as
reported here. I believe the described "disappearances" cannot, in view
of these several considerations, reasonably be attributed to cloud
effects.
I have now summarized
the essential features of the Haneda report dealing with just the
visual observations of some bright luminous source that initiated the
alert and that led to the ground-radar and air borne-radar observations
yet to be described. Before turning to those, which comprise, in fact,
the more significant portion of the over-all sighting, it will be best
to turn next to a critique of the Blue book and the Condon Report
attempts to give an explanation of the visual portions of the sighting.
3. Bluebook Critique
of the Visual Sightings:
In IR-35-52. Capt,
Malven offers only one hypothesis, and that in only passing manner: He
speculates briefly on whether "reflections off the water (of the Bay, I
presume) were...sufficient to form secondary reflections off the lower
clouds," and by the latter he refers to "isolated patches of thin
clouds reported by the F-94 crew as being at approximately 4000
feet..." He adds that "these clouds were not reported to be visible by
the control tower personnel," which, in view of the 60-mile visibility
cited elsewhere in the case-file and in view of the full moon then near
the local meridian, suggests that those lower clouds must have been
exceedingly widely scattered to escape detection by the controllers.
What Malven seems to
offer there, as an hypothesis for the observed visual source, is
cloud-reflection of moonlight -- and in manner all too typical of many
other curious physical explanations one finds scattered through
Bluebook case-files, he brings in a consideration that reveals lack of
appreciation of what is central to the issue. If he wants to talk about
cloud-reflected moonlight, why render a poor argument even weaker by
invoking not direct moon light but moonlight secondarily reflected off
the surface of Tokyo Bay? Without even considering further that odd
twist in his tentative hypothesis, it is sufficient to note that even
direct moonlight striking a patch of cloud is not "reflected in any
ordinary sense of that term. It is scattered from the cloud droplets
and thereby serves not to create any image of a discrete light source
of blinding intensity that fatigues observers' eyes and does the other
things reported by the Haneda observers, but rather serves merely to
palely illuminate a passing patch of cloud material. A very poor
hypothesis.
Malven drops that
hypothesis without putting any real stress on it (with judgment that is
not always found where equally absurd "explanations" have been advanced
in innumerable other Bluebook case-files by reporting officers or by
Bluebook staff members). He does add that there was some thunderstorm
activity reported that night off to the northwest of Tokyo, but
mentions that there was no reported electrical activity therein. Since
the direction is opposite to the line of sight and since the reported
visual phenomena bear no relation to lightning effects, this carried
the matter no further, and the report drops that point there.
Finally, Malven
mentions very casually an idea that I have encountered repeatedly in
Bluebook files yet nowhere else in my studies of atmospheric physics,
namely, "reflections off ionized portions of the atmosphere." He
states: "Although many sightings might be attributed to visual and
electrical reflections off ionized areas in the atmosphere, the
near-perfect visibility on the night of the sighting, together with the
circular orbit of the object would tend to disprove this theory."
Evidently he rejects the "ionized areas" hypothesis on the ground that
presence of such areas is probably ruled out in view of the unusually
good visibility reported that night. I trust that, for most readers of
this discussion, I would only be belaboring the obvious to remark that
Bluebook mythology about radar and visual "reflections" off "ionized
regions" in the clear atmosphere (which mythology I have recently
managed to trace back even to pre-1950 Air Force documents on UFO
reports) has no known basis in fact, but is just one more of the all
too numerous measures of how little scientific critique the Air Force
has managed to bring to bear on its UFO problems over the years.
Although the final
Bluebook evaluation of this entire case, including the visual portions,
was and is "Unidentified", indicating that none of the above was
regarded as an adequate explanation of even the visual features of the
report, one cannot overlook extremely serious deficiencies in the basic
report ing and the interrogation and follow-up here. This incident
occurred in that period which my own studies lead me to describe as
sort of a highwater mark for Project Bluebook. Capt. Edward J. Ruppelt
was then Bluebook Officer at Wright-Patterson AFB, and both he and his
superiors were then taking the UFO problem more seriously than it was
taken by USAF at any other time in the past 22 years. Neither before
nor after 1952-3 were there as many efforts made to assemble
case-information, to go out and actually check in the field on
sightings, etc. Yet it should be uncomfortably apparent already at this
point in this discussion of the Haneda case that quite basic points
were not run to ground and pinned down. Ruppelt, in his 1956 book,
speaks of this Haneda case as if it were regarded as one of the most
completely reported cases they'd received as of mid-1952. He mentioned
that his office sent a query to FEAF offices about a few points of
confusion, and that the replies came back with impressive promptness,
etc. If one needed some specific clue to the regrettably low scientific
level of the operation of Bluebook even during this period of
comparatively energetic case-investigation, one can find it in study of
the Haneda report. Even so simple a matter as checking whether Venus
was actually in the East was obviously left undone; and numerous
cross-questions and followup queries on motions, angles, times, etc.,
not even thought of. That, I stress, is what any scientist who studies
the Bluebook files as I have done will find all through 22 years of Air
Force handling of the UFO problem. Incompetence and superficiality --
even at the 1952 highwater mark under Ruppelt's relatively vigorous!
And in the final
paragraph discussing this case, the Condon Report merely rounds it off
to: "In summary , it appears that the most probable causes of this UFO
report are an optical effect on a bright light source that produced the
visual sighting..." (and goes on to a remark on the radar portions we
have yet to examine here) .
There are some very
serious difficulties with the more specific parts of the suggested
explanation, and the vagueness of the other parts is sufficiently
self-evident to need little comment.
First, nothing in the
literature of meteorological optics discusses any diffraction-produced
corona with a dark annular space extending out to three or four
diameters of the central luminary, such as is postulated in the above
Condon Report explanation. The radial intensity pattern of a corona may
be roughly described as a damped oscillatory radial variation of
luminosity, with zero intensity minima (for the simple case of a
monochromatic luminary) at roughly equal intervals, and no broad
light-free annulus comparable to that described in detail by the Haneda
controllers. Thus, lack of understanding of the nature of corona is
revealed at the outset in attempting to fit the Haneda observations to
such a phenomenon.
Second, droplets
certainly do not have to be "spaced at regular intervals" to yield a
corona, and Minnaert's book makes no such suggestion, another measure
of misunderstanding of the meteorological optics here concerned. Nor is
there any physical mechanism operating in clouds capable of yielding
any such regular droplet spacing. Both Minnaert and cloud physics are
misunderstood in that passage.
Third, one quickly
finds, by some trial calculations, using the familiar optical relation
(Exner equation) for the radial positions of the minima of the
classical corona pattern, that the cited drop diameter of 0.2 mm = 200
microns was obtained in the Condon Report by back-calculating from a
tacit requirement that the first-order minimum lay close to 3
milliradians, for these are the values that satisfy the Exner equation
for an assumed wavelength of about 0.5 microns for visible light. This
discloses even more thorough misunderstanding of corona optics, for
that first-order minimum marks not some outer edge of a broad dark
annulus as described and sketched by the Haneda tower operators, but
the outer edge of the innermost annulus of high intensity of diffracted
light. This clearly identifies basic misunderstanding of the matters at
hand.
Fourth, the just-cited
computation yielded a droplet diameter of 200 microns, which is so
large as to be found only in drizzling or raining clouds and never in
thin scattered clouds of the sort here reported, clouds that scarcely
attenuated the full moon's light. That is, the suggestion that "patches
of fog or mist" collected under an hypothesized inversion could grow
droplets of that large size is meteorologically out of the question. If
isolated patches of clouds interposed themselves on an observer's line
of sight to some distant luminary, under conditions of the sort
prevailing at Haneda that night, drop diameters down in the range of
10-20 microns would be the largest one could expect, and the
corona-size would be some 10 to 20 times greater than the 3
milliradians which was plugged into the Exner equation in the above
computation.
Fifth, the vague
suggestion that "Raman brightening" or other "interference effects
associated with propagation within and near the top of an inversion" is
involved here makes the same serious error that is made in attempted
optical explanations of other cases in the Condon Report. Here we are
asked to consider that light from Capella, whose altitude was about 8
deg. above the NE horizon (a value that I confirm) near the time of the
Haneda observations, was subjected to Raman brightening or its
equivalent; yet one of the strict requirements of all such interference
effects is that the ray paths impinge on the inversion surface at
grazing angles of incidence of only a small fraction of a degree. No
ground observer viewing Capella at 8 deg. elevation angle could
possibly see anything like Raman brightening, for the pertinent angular
limits would be exceeded by one or two orders of magnitude. Added to
this measure of misunderstanding of the optics of such interference
phenomena in this attempted explanation is the further difficulty that,
for any such situation as is hypothesized in the Condon Report
explanation, the observer's eye must be physically located at or
directly under the index- discontinuity, which would here mean up in
the air at the altitude of the hypothesized inversion. But all of the
Haneda observations were made from the ground level. Negation of Raman
brightening leaves one more serious gap in the Capella hypothesis,
since its magnitude of 0.2 lies at a brightness level well below that
of Jupiter, yet the Haneda observers seem to have been comparing the
object's luminosity to Jupiter's and finding it far brighter, not
dimmer.
Sixth, the Condon
Report mentions the independent sighting from Tachikawa AFB, but fails
to bring out that the line of sight from that observing site (luminary
described as lying over Tokyo Bay, as seen from Tachikawa) pointed more
than 45 deg. away from Capella, a circumstance fatal to fitting the
Capella hypothesis to both sightings. Jupiter lay due East, not "over
Tokyo Bay" from Tachikawa, and it had been rising in the eastern sky
for many days, so it is, in any event, unlikely to have suddenly
triggered an independent response at Tachikawa that night. And,
conversely, the area intersection of the reported lines of sight from
Haneda and Tachikawa falls in just the North Bay area where Shiroi GCI
first got radar returns and where all the subsequent radar activity was
localized.
Seventh, nothing in
the proffered explanations in the Condon Report confronts the reported
movements and disappearances of the luminous object that are described
in the Bluebook case-file on Haneda. If, for the several reasons
offered above, we conclude that not only apparent radial motions, but
also lateral and climbing motions were observed, neither diffraction
nor Raman effects can conceivably fit them.
Eighth, the over-all
configuration as seen through 7X binoculars, particularly with four
smaller lights perceived on the lower edge of the broad dark annulus,
is not in any sense explained by the ideas qualitatively advanced.
Ninth, the Condon
Report puts emphasis on the point that, whereas Haneda and Tachikawa
observers saw the light, airmen at the Shiroi GCI site went outside and
looked in vain for the light when the plotted radar position showed one
or more targets to their south or south-southeast. This is correct. But
we are quite familiar with both highly directional and semi-directional
light sources on our own technological devices, so the failure to
detect a light from the Shiroi side does not very greatly strengthen
the hypothesis that Capella was the luminary in the Haneda visual
sightings. The same can be said for lack of visual observations from
the F-94, (which got only radar returns as it closed on its target).
I believe that it is
necessary to conclude that the "explanation" proposed in the Condon
Report for the visual portions of the Haneda case are almost wholly
unacceptable. And I remark that my analysis of many other explanations
in the Condon Report finds them to be about equally weak in their level
of scientific argumentation. We were supposed to get in the Condon
Report a level of critique distinctly better than that which had come
from Bluebook for many years; but much of the critique in that Report
is little less tendentious and ill-based than that which is so
dismaying in 22 years of Air Force discussions of UFO cases. The above
stands as only one illustration of the point I make there; many more
could be cited.
Next we must examine
the radar aspects of the 8/5-6/52 Haneda case.
5. Radar Observations:
Shortly after the
initial visual sighting at Haneda, the tower controllers alerted the
Shiroi GCI radar unit (located about 15 miles NE of central Tokyo),
asking them to look for a target somewhere NE of Haneda at an altitude
which they estimated (obviously on weak grounds) to be somewhere
between 1500 and 5000 feet, both those figures appearing in the
Bluebook case-file. Both a CPS-1 search radar and a CPS-4 height-finder
radar were available at Shiroi, but only the first of those picked up
the target, ground clutter interference precluding useful CPS-4
returns. The CPS-1 radar was a 10-cm, 2-beam set with peak power of 1
megawatt, PRF of 400/sec, antenna tilt 3 deg., and scan-rate operated
that night at 4 rpm. I find no indication that it was equipped with
MTI, but this point is not certain.
It may help to keep
the main sequence of events in better time order if I first put down
the principal events that bear on the radar sightings from ground and
air, and the times at which these events occurred. In some instances a
1-2 minute range of times will be given because the case-file contains
more than a single time for that event as described in separate
sections of the report. I indicate 0015-16 LST (all times still LST) as
the time of first airborne radar contact by the F-94, and discuss that
matter in more detail later, since the Condon Report suggests a quite
different time.
Time (LST) Event 2330 Tower
controllers at Haneda see bright light to NE, call Shiroi GCI within a
few minutes.
2330-45 Lt. A,
Shiroi radar controller on evening watch, looks for returns, finds 3-4
stationary blips to NE of Haneda on low beam of CPS-1.
2345 Lt. B comes
on duty for midwatch at Shiroi; he and Lt. A discuss possible
interceptor scramble.
2355 Lt. A calls
Johnson AFB, asks for F-94 scramble. Fuel system trouble causes delay
of 5-10 min.
0001 Lt. B has
unknown in right orbit at varying speeds over north Tokyo Bay, 8 miles
NE of Haneda. Loses contact again.
0003-04 F-94
airborne out of Johnson AFB, Lt. P as pilot, Lt. R, radarman.
0009-10 Shiroi
alerts F-94 to airborne target to its starboard as it heads down Tokyo
Bay, and Lt. P visually identifies target as C-54 in pattern to land at
Haneda. Lt. B instructs Lt. P to begin search over north Bay area at
flight altitude of 5000 ft.
0012 Shiroi
regains CPS-1 contact on unknown target in right orbit over same
general area seen before, target splits into three separate targets,
and Lt. B vectors F-94 toward strongest of three returns.
0015-16 F-94 gets
airborne radar contact on moving target at range and bearing close to
vector information, has to do hard starboard turn to keep onscope as
target moves with acceleration across scope.
0017-18 After 90
seconds pursuit, with no lock-on achieved, target moves offscope at
high speed; Shiroi GCI tracks both unknown and F-94 into its ground
clutter, where both are then lost in clutter.
0033 Shiroi
releases F-94 from scramble-search
0040 F-94
visually spots another C-54, over Johnson.
0120 F-94 lands
back at Johnson.
Thus the period 2330
on 8/5 through about 0018 on 8/6 is of present interest: Next, events
in that period till be examined in closer detail.
a. Initial attempts at
radar detection from Shiroi GCI. When, at about 2335 or so, Haneda
requested Shiroi to search the area of the bay to the NE of Haneda (SSW
from Shiroi, roughly), Lt. A, then duty controller at Shiroi, found his
CPS-4 giving too much ground clutter to be useful for the relatively
low estimated heights Haneda had suggested. Those heights are indicated
as 1500-2000 ft in one portion of the case- file, though Airman A
elsewhere gave 5000 ft as his impression of the height. Clearly, lack
of knowledge of size and slant ranges precluded any exact estimates
from Haneda, but they offered the above indicated impressions.
Trying both low and
high beams on the CPS-1 search radar, Lt. A did detect three or four
blips "at a position 050 deg. bearing from Haneda, as reported by the
tower, but no definite movement could be ascertained..." The report
gives no information on the range from Shiroi, nor inferred altitude of
those several blips, only the first of a substantial number of missing
items of quite essential information that were not followed up in any
Bluebook inquiries, as far as the case-file shows. No indication of the
spacing of the several targets is given either, so it is difficult to
decide whether to consider the above as an instance of "radar visual"
concurrency or not. One summary discussion in the Bluebook case-file so
construes it: "The radar was directed onto the target by visual
observations from the tower. So it can safely be assumed that both
visual and radar contacts involved the same object." By contrast, the
Condon Report takes the position that there were no radar observations
that ever matched the visual observations. The latter view seems more
justified than the former, although the issue is basically
unresolvable. One visual target won't, in any event, match 3-4 radar
targets, unless we invoke the point that later on the main radar target
split up into three separate radar targets, and assume that at 2335,
3-4 unknown objects were airborne and motionless, with only one of
these luminous and visually detectable from Haneda. That is conceivable
but involves too strained assumptions to take very seriously; so I
conclude that, even in this opening radar search, there was not obvious
correspondence between visual and radar unknowns. As we shall see,
later on there was definitely not correspondence, and also the F-94
crew never spotted a visual target. Thus, Haneda cannot be viewed as a
case involving the kind of "radar-visual" concurrency which does
characterize many other important cases. Nonetheless, both the visual
and the radar features, considered separately, are sufficiently unusual
in the Haneda case to regard them as mutually supporting the view that
inexplicable events were seen and tracked there that night.
One may ask why a
radar-detected object was not seen visually, and why a luminous object
was not detected on search radar; and no fully satisfactory answer lies
at hand for either question. It can only be noted that there are many
other such cases in Bluebook files and that these questions stand as
part of the substantial scientific puzzle that centers around the UFO
phenomena. We know that light-sources can be turned off, and we do know
that ECM techniques can fool radars to a certain extent. Thus, we might
do well to maintain open minds when we come to these questions that are
so numerous in UFO case analysis.
b. F-94 scramble. When
Lt. B came on duty at 2345, he was soon able, according to Capt.
Malven's summary in IR-35-52, "to make radar contact on the 50-mile
high beam," whereupon he and Lt. A contacted the ADCC flight controller
at Johnson AFB 35 miles to their west, requesting that an interceptor
be scrambled to investigate the source of the visual and the radar
sightings.
An F-94B of the 339th
Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, piloted by Lt. P, with Lt. R operating
the APG-33 air-intercept radar, was scrambled, though a delay of over
ten minutes intervened because of fuel-system difficulties during
engine runup. The records show the F-94 airborne at about 0003-04, and
it then took about 10 minutes to reach the Tokyo Bay area. The APG-33
set was a 3-cm (X-band) set with 50 KW power, and lock-on range of
about 2500 yards, according to my information. The system had a
B-scope, i.e., it displayed target range vs. azimuth. The case-file
notes that: "The APG-33 radar is checked before and after every mission
and appeared to be working normally."
At 0009, Shiroi picked
up a moving target near Haneda and alerted the F-94 crew, who had no
difficulty identifying it visually as an Air Force C-54 in the Haneda
pattern. The crew is quoted in the report as reporting "exceptional
visibility." Shiroi instructed the F-94 to begin searching at 5000 ft
altitude as it got out over the Bay. But before proceeding with events
of that search, a GCI detection of a moving target at about 0001 must
be reviewed.
c. First GCI detection
of orbiting object. Just before the F-94 became airborne out of Johnson
AFB, Lt. B picked up the first definitely unusual moving target, at
about 0000-01. His statement in the Bluebook case-file reads: "At the
time of the scramble, I had what was believed to be the object in radar
contact. The radar sighting indicated the object to be due south of
this station over Tokyo Bay and approximately eight (8) miles northeast
of Haneda. The target was in a right orbit moving at varying speeds. It
was impossible to estimate speed due to She short distance and times
involved." That passage is quoted in the Condon Report, but not the
next, which comes from Malven's summary and indicates that Lt. B only
meant that it was impossible to estimate the target's speed with much
accuracy. The omitted passage is interesting, for it is one of a number
of indications that anomalous propagation (which is the Condon Report's
explanation for the radar sightings) is scarcely creditable:
A map accompanying
IR-35-52 shows the plotted orbiting path of the unknown target. The
orbit radius is approximately 4 miles, centered just off the coast from
the city of Funabashi, east of Tokyo. The orbiting path is about half
over land, half over water. The map sketch, plus the file comments,
imply that GCI had good contacts with the target only while it was
moving out over the Bay. The ground-clutter pattern of the CPS-1 is
plotted on the same map (and on other maps in the file), and it seems
clear that the difficulty in tracking the target through the land
portion of the roughly circular orbit was that most of that portion lay
within the clutter area. The presumption is strong that this set did
not have MTI, which is unfortunate.
The circumference of
the orbit of about 4-mi radius would be about 25 miles. Taking Lt. B's
rough estimate of 100-150 knots in the first of the two circuits of
this orbit (i.e., the one he detected at about 0001), a total
circuit-time of perhaps 12-13 minutes is indicated. Although the basis
for this time-estimate is quite rough, it matches reasonably well the
fact that it was about 0012 when it had come around again, split up
into three targets, and looped onshore again with the F-94 in pursuit
this time.
If the object
executing the above orbits had been the luminous object being watched
from Haneda, it would have swung back and forth across their sky
through an azimuth range of about 30 deg. Since no such motion seems to
have been noted by the Haneda observers, I believe it must be concluded
that the source they watched was distinct from the one radar-tracked in
orbit.
d. Second orbit and
F-94 intercept attempt. The times given in Lt. B's account of this
phase of the sighting do not match those given by the pilot and
radarman of the F-94 in their signed statements in the file. Other
accounts in the file match those of the aircrew, but not the times in
Lt. B's summary. This discrepancy (about 10-12 minutes) is specifically
noted in Capt. Malven's IR-35-52 summary: "The ten minute difference in
time between the statement by Lt. B, 528th ACGW SQ, and that reported
by other personnel concerned, is believed to be a typographical error,
since the statement agrees on every other portion of the sighting."
That Lt. B and the aircrew were describing one and the same intercept
seems beyond any doubt; and in view of Malven's quoted comment, I here
use the times recorded by the aircrew and accepted as the correct times
in other parts of the case-file. Further comment on this will be given
below.
After completing the
first of the two orbits partially tracked by GCI Shiroi, the target
came around again where it was out of the CPS-1 ground- clutter
pattern, and Lt. B regained contact. Malven's summary comments on the
next developments as follows: "At 0012 the object reportedly broke into
three smaller contacts, maintaining an interval of about 1/4 miles,
with one contact remaining somewhat brighter. The F-94 was vectored on
this object, reporting weak contact at 1500 and loss of contact at
0018. Within a few seconds, both the F-94 and the object entered the
ground clutter and were not seen again."
The same portion of
the incident is summarized in Lt. B's account (with different times),
with the F-94 referred to by its code-name "Sun Dial 20." Immediately
following the part of his account referring to the first starboard
orbit in which he had plotted the target's movements, at around 0001,
comes the following section: "Sun Dial 20 was ordered to search the
Tokyo Bay area keeping a sharp lookout for any unusual occurrences. The
obJect was again sighted by radar at 0017 on a starboard orbit in the
same area as before. Sun Dial 20 was vectored to the target. He
reported contact at 0025 and reported losing contact at 0028. Sun Dial
20 followed the target into our radar ground clutter area and we were
unable to give Sun Dial 20 further assistance in re- establishing
contact. Sun Dial 20 again resumed his visual search of the area until
0014, reporting negative visual sighting on this object at any time."
If Malven's suggestion of typographical error is correct, the
in-contact times in the foregoing should read 0015 and 0018, and
presumably 0017 should be 0012. But regardless of the precise times,
the important point is that Lt. B vectored the F-94 into the target,
contact was thereby achieved, and Lt. B followed the target and
pursuing F-94 northeastward into his ground clutter. I stress this
because, in the Condon Report, the matter of the different times quoted
is offered as the sole basis of a conclusion that ground radar and
airborne radar were never following the same target. This is so clearly
inconsistent with the actual contents of the case-file that it is
difficult to understand the Report rationale.
Even more certain
indication that the GCI radar was tracking target and F- 94 in this
crucial phase is given in the accounts prepared and signed by the pilot
and his radarman. Here again we meet a code-designation, this time "Hi-
Jinx", which was the designation for Shiroi GCI used in the
air-to-ground radio transmissions that night and hence employed in
these next two accounts. The F-94 pilot, Lt. P states: "The object was
reported to be in the Tokyo Bay area in an orbit to the starboard at an
estimated altitude of 5,000 feet. I observed nothing of an unusual
nature in this area; however, at 0016 when vectored by Hi-Jinx on a
heading of 320 degrees, and directed to look for a bogie at 1100
o'clock, 4 miles, Lt. R made radar contact at 10 degrees port, 6000
yards. The point moved rapidly from port to starboard and disappeared
from the scope. I had no visual contact with the target."
And the signed
statement from the radarman, Lt. R, is equally definite about these
events: "At 0015 Hi-Jinx gave us a vector of 320 degrees. Hi-Jinx had a
definite radar echo and gave us the vector to intercept the
unidentified target. Hi-Jinx estimated the target to be at 11 o'clock
to us at a range of 4 miles. At 0016 I picked up the radar contact at
10 degrees port, 10 degrees below at 6,000 yards. The target was
rapidly moving from port to starboard and a 'lock on' could not be
accomplished. A turn to the starboard was instigated to intercept
target which disappeared on scope in approximately 90 seconds. No
visual contact was made with the unidentified target. We continued our
search over Tokyo Bay under Hi-Jinx control. At 0033 Hi-Jinx released
us from scrambled mission..."
Of particular
importance is the very close agreement of the vectoring instructions
given by Shiroi GCI to the F-94 and the actual relative position at
which they accomplished radar contact; GCI said 4 miles range at the
aircraft's 11 o'clock position, and they actually got radar contact
with the moving target at a 6000-yard range, 10 degrees to their port.
Nearly exact agreement, and thus incontrovertibly demonstrating that
ground-radar and airborne radar were then looking at the same moving
unknown target, despite the contrary suggestions made in the Condon
Report. Had the Condon Report presented all of the information in the
case-file, it would have been difficult to maintain the curious
position that is maintained all of the way to the final conclusion
about these radar events in the Condon Report's treatment of the Haneda
case.
That the moving
target, as seen by both ground and airborne radar was a distinct
target, though exhibiting radar cross-section somewhat smaller than
that typical of most aircraft, is spelled out in Malven's IR-35-52
summary: "Lt.B, GCI Controller at the Shiroi GCI site, has had
considerable experience under all conditions and thoroughly understands
the capabilities of the CPS-1 radar. His statement was that the object
was a bonafide moving target, though somewhat weaker than that normally
obtained from a single jet fighter." And, with reference to the
airborne radar contact, the same report states; "Lt. R, F-94 radar
operator, has had about seven years' experience with airborne radar
equipment. He states that the object was a bonafide target, and that to
his knowledge, there was nothing within an area of 15-20 miles that
could give the radar echo." It is exceedingly difficult to follow the
Condon Report in viewing such targets as due to anomalous propagation.
Not only were there no
visual sightings of the orbiting target as viewed from the F-94, but
neither were there any from the Shiroi site, though Lt. B specifically
sent men out to watch as these events transpired. Also, as mentioned
earlier, it seems out of the question to equate any of the Haneda
visual observations to the phase of the incident just discussed. Had
there been a bright light on the unknown object during the time it was
in starboard orbit, the Haneda observers would almost certainly have
reported those movements. To be sure, the case-file is incomplete in
not indicating how closely the Haneda observers were kept in touch as
the GCI directed radar- intercept was being carried out. But at least
it is clear that the Haneda tower controllers did not describe motions
of the intensely bright light that would fit the roughly circular
starboard orbits of radius near four miles. Thus, we seem forced to
conclude either that the target the F-94 pursued was a different one
from that observed at Haneda (likely interpretation), or that it was
non-luminous during that intercept (unlikely alternative, since Haneda
observations did not have so large a period of non-visibility of the
source they had under observation 2330-0020).
6. Condon Report
Critique of the Radar Sightings:
The Bluebook case-file
contains essentially no discussion of the radar events, no suggestion
of explanations in terms of any electronic or propagational anomalies.
The case was simply put in the Unexplained category back in 1952 and
has remained in that category since then at Bluebook.
By contrast, the
Condon Report regards the above radar events as attributable to
anomalous propagation. Four reasons are offered (p. 126) in support of
that conclusion:
1) The tendency for
targets to disappear and reappear;
2) The tendency for
the target to break up into smaller targets;
3) The apparent lack
of correlation between the targets seen on the GCI and airborne radars;
4) The radar
invisibility of the target when visibility was "exceptionally good."
Each of these four
points will now be considered.
First, the "tendency
for the targets to disappear and reappear" was primarily a matter of
the orbiting target's moving into and out of the ground- clutter
pattern of the CPS-1, as is clearly shown in the map that constitutes
Enclosure #5 in the IR-35-52 report, which was at the disposal of the
Colorado staff concerned with this case. Ground returns from AP
(anomalous propagation) may fade in and out as ducting intensities
vary, but here we have the case of a moving target disappearing into
and emerging from ground clutter, while executing a roughly circular
orbit some 4 miles in radius. I believe it is safe to assert that
nothing in the annals of anomalous propagation matches such behavior.
Nor could the Borden-Vickers hypothesis of "reflections" off moving
waves on inversions fit this situation, since such waves would not
propagate in orbits, but would, at best, advance with the direction and
speed of the mean wind at the inversion. Furthermore, the indicated
target speed in the final phases of the attempted intercept was greater
than that of the F-94, i.e., over 400 knots, far above wind speeds
prevailing that night, so this could not in any event be squared with
the (highly doubtful) Borden-Vickers hypothesis that was advanced years
ago to account for the 1952 Washington National Airport UFO incidents.
Second, the breakup of
the orbiting target into three separate targets cannot fairly be
referred to as a "tendency for the target to break up into smaller
targets." That breakup event occurred in just one definite instance,
and the GCI controller chose to vector the F-94 onto the strongest of
the resultant three targets. And when the F-94 initiated radar search
in the specific area (11 o'clock at 4 miles) where that target was then
moving, it immediately achieved radar contact. For the Condon Report to
gloss over such definite features of the report and merely allude to
all of this in language faintly suggestive of AP seems objectionable.
Third, to build a
claim that there was "apparent lack of correlation between the targets
seen on the GCI and airborne radars" on the sole basis of the mismatch
of times listed by Lt. B on the one hand and by the aircrew on the
other hand, to ignore the specific statement by the intelligence
officer filing IR-35-52 about this being a typographical error on the
part of Lt. B, and, above all, to ignore the obviously close
correspondence between GCI and air borne radar targeting that led to
the successful radar-intercept, and finally to ignore Lt. B's statement
that the F-94 "followed the target into our radar ground clutter", all
amount to a highly slanted assessment of case details, details not
openly set out for the reader of the Condon Report to evaluate for
himself. I believe that all of the material I have here extracted from
the Haneda case file fully contradicts the third of the Condon Report
four reasons for attributing the radar events to AP. I would suggest
that it is precisely the impressive correlation between GCI and F-94
radar targeting on this non-visible, fast-moving object that
constitutes the most important feature of the whole case.
Fourth, it is
suggested that AP is somehow suspected because of "the radar
invisibility of the target when visibility was 'exceptionally good.'"
This is simply unclear. The exceptional visibility of the atmosphere
that night is not physically related to "radar invisibility" in any
way, and I suspect this was intended to read "the invisibility of the
radar target when visibility was exceptionally good." As cited above,
neither the Shiroi crew nor the F-94 crew ever saw any visible object
to match their respective radar targets. Under some circumstances, such
a situation would indeed be diagnostic of AP. BUt not here, where the
radar target is moving at high speed around an orbit many miles in
diameter, occasionally hovering motionless (see Malven's account cited
earlier), and changing speed from 100-150 knots up to 250-300 knots,
and finally accelerating to well above an F-94's 375-knot speed.
Thus, all four of the
arguments offered in the Condon Report to support its claim that the
Haneda radar events were due to anomalous propagation must be rejected.
Those arguments seem to me to be built up by a highly selective
extraction of details from the Bluebook case-file, by ignoring the
limits of the kind of effects one can expect from AP, and by using
wording that so distorts key events in the incident as to give a vague
impression where the facts of the case are really quite specific.
It has, of course,
taken more space to clarify this Haneda case than the case is given in
the Condon Report itself. Unfortunately, this would also prove true of
the clarification of some fifteen to twenty other UFO cases whose
"explanation" in the Condon Report contains, in my opinion, equally
objectionable features, equally casual glossing-over of physical
principles, of important quantitative points. Equally serious omissions
of basic case information mark many of those case discussions in the
Condon Report. Here I have used Haneda only as an illustration of those
points; but I stress that it is by no means unique. The Condon Report
confronted a disappointingly small sample of the old "classic" cases,
the long-puzzling cases that have kept the UFO question alive over the
years, and those few that it did confront it explained away by
argumentation as unconvincing as that which disposes of the Haneda AFB
events in terms of diffraction of Capella and anomalous propagation.
Scientifically weak argumentation is found in a large fraction of the
case analysis of the Condon Report, and stands as the principal reason
why its conclusions ought to be rejected.
Here are some other
examples of UFO cases considered explained in the Condon Report for
which I would take strong exception to the argumentation presented and
would regard as both unexplained and of strong scientific interest
(page numbers in Condon Report are indicated): Flagstaff, Ariz.,
5/20/50 (p. 245); Washington, D. C., 7/19/52 (p. 153); Bellefontaine,
O., 8/1/52 (p. 161); Gulf of Mexico, 12/6/52 (p. 148); Odessa, Wash.,
12/10/52 (p. 140); Continental Divide, N.M., 1/26/53 (p. 143); Seven
Isles, Quebec, 6/29/54 (p. 139); Niagara Falls, N.Y., 7/25/57 (p. 145);
Kirtland AFB, N.M., 11/4/57 (p. 141); Gulf of Mexico, 11/5/57 (p. 165);
Peru, 12/30/66 (p. 280); Holloman AFB, 3/2/67 (p. 150); Kincheloe AFB,
9/11/67 (p. 164); Vandenberg AFB, 10/6/67 (p. 353).
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