Lieutenant General Otto J. Glasser served as the director of
the Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program, the
nation's highest priority military project in the mid-1950s. He was an
original member of General Bernard A. Schriever's "Schoolhouse Gang" of
four at the Western Development Division. General Glasser's leadership
of the fast-paced and successful development of the Atlas provided the
nation with its first deployed ICBM. The Atlas also served as a launch
vehicle for the Air Force's Weapon System 117L satellite program. This
dual purpose vehicle catapulted a communications satellite into space
in 1958, beginning an era of reliable launches of satellites by the Air
Force.
General Glasser was born in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, on 2
Oct 1918. He graduated from Cornell University in 1940 with a
Bachelor's degree in electrical engineering. In May 1940, he earned a
commission as a second lieutenant in the Officers Reserve Corps and
later began active duty in the Army Signal Corps in February 1941. For
the next two years, he served in the Caribbean area and was responsible
for the installation and operation of early warning radar systems.
He entered flying training in September 1943, graduated the
following June, and then received transition training in the B-17,
B-24, and B-29. After World War II, he attended Ohio State University
where he earned his Master's degree in electronic physics in 1947.
Subsequently, General Glasser took an assignment at the Armed Forces
Special Weapons Project in Albuquerque, New Mexico. In January 1951, he
enrolled in the Air Command and Staff School which he completed in May
1951. He next became Chief, Munitions Branch, Research and Development
Directorate, HQ USAF.
In July 1954, General Glasser joined the Western Development
Division (WDD) of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) in
Los Angeles. He was one of the original group assembled to develop the
first ICBM.1 Glasser described how General Schriever,
commander of the WDD, persuaded him to come to the WDD when Glasser was
contemplating leaving the service because the Air Force had not
assigned him to a flying position. Schriever, who had offered Glasser a
job at the WDD, claimed Glasser would be "crazy" to turn down his offer
and resign, and promised Glasser that he would meet "all kinds of
people that will be valuable to you in getting a good job" in civilian
life. Glasser acknowledged, "That sounded reasonable, so hell, I went
off with him [General Schriever] for one year to the West Coast. There
I was, years later," he related, "still in."2 Glasser
admitted one could not foresee the direction a person's career would
take.3
At WDD, Glasser first worked on the warhead for the Atlas.
This task proved so tractable that its solution came quickly. In
several months Glasser and his associates had completed design of the
warhead.4
Next, General Glasser headed Facilities and Testing at WDD.
His organization determined how many tests the Air Force would conduct
on the missiles it was developing and that it would hold these tests at
Patrick Air Force Base. The group worked out details which led to a
successful test program.5
General Glasser also involved himself in several important
decisions which affected the development of the Atlas. One was to build
the missile with a ten-foot diameter instead of the twelve-foot
diameter which its predecessor, Convair's MX-1593, had. This was
possible because the missile could now carry the new 3,000 pound
warhead instead of the old 10,000 pound warhead, and the smaller and
lighter warhead did not require as large and powerful a missile as its
predecessor. General Glasser was also instrumental in the decision to
develop two propulsion systems for the Atlas, one built by North
American's Rocketdyne Division and one built by Aerojet General.
Resultantly, the Air Force would have a backup propulsion system for
the Atlas. In addition, General Glasser participated in the choice of
an inertial as opposed to a non-inertial guidance system for the Atlas.
And he helped select General Electric and AVCO for the building of
separate, interchangeable, reentry systems for the Atlas.6
In February 1956, General Glasser became the Director of the
Atlas program.7 According to Glasser, he and his staff
reached systems decisions in the following manner:
It . . . [was] patent as you . . . [went] through the design
of a system that, if you were to build the best possible propulsion
system, you would probably accrue constraints on the guidance system.
Conversely, if you say, "I'm going to make the guidance system the best
that it can possibly be," the flight profile of the mission might be
such that you would get excessive aerodynamic heating. Compromise of
each element is the answer. But this compromise or adjustment would not
be feasible should the program be segmented and fragmented through a
series of offices. This is only possible when you have an integrated
systems-engineering[,] technical-direction group which has all the
pieces under its control.8
The Atlas program was distinctive. General Glasser explained
that the urgency of the Atlas program deterred the US Air Force from
undertaking a testing program similar to the one the Germans had used
in their V-2 program. The Germans performed 3,000 flight tests to
produce an effective operational missile. For the United States, during
the Cold War era, using so large a number of flight tests was
impracticable. The constraints of time, energy, money, and resources
militated against it.
Instead, the US streamlined its program. Glasser engineered a
program which tested individual parts first, then components and
assemblies, subsystems and stages, eliminating all possible sources of
error before committing the subsystem to a completely integrated
missile. Next, personnel tested the integrated missile, firing it up,
checking it out, while a captive stand held it down; eliminating, so
far as possible in this artificial environment, sources of error.
However, captive testing carried with it the advantage of rigor. In
this ambience, the Air Force used sophisticated monitoring
instrumentation that it could not use while the Atlas was in flight.9
After static evaluation and only then, General Glasser's organization
flight-tested a number of Atlas missiles in each developmental series,
carrying out a specific list of tests on every missile.10
However, as General Glasser anticipated, the Atlas program
encountered difficulties. He knew that any realistic schedule of
research and development must include leeway for mishaps resulting in
lost time. Had not his organization prepared for such eventualities as
the explosion of an Atlas engine on a test stand by having extra
engines available for testing at alternate sites, such incidents could
have disrupted the missile's overall timetable for development.11
Beyond such happenstance, the solution of technical problems
presented a basic challenge. Heating of the Atlas's nosecone was
particularly nettlesome. To facilitate the conception of an efficient
design to deal with this problem, Glasser worked with engineers who
fashioned and tested a myriad of shapes for the nosecone. Using models
of nosecones, they checked on the efficacy of their designs under the
simulated conditions of reentry provided by wind tunnels.12
All the while, General Glasser and his colleagues worked
under the guidance of General Schriever. Glasser recalled an incident
which illustrated General Schriever's intense desire to have the US
outstrip the Soviet Union in the missile race. After a particularly
rough week, Schriever, who was in San Francisco, wandered into
Chinatown late one Saturday night. Preoccupied with thoughts of the
ballistic missile program and how well it was faring, he stopped in
front of a gift shop's window. He saw before him the melancholy faces
of his three belabored project officers reflected in three wooden
figurines which he purchased and brought back to Los Angeles. Early the
subsequent Monday morning, he summoned his three project directors,
Colonel Glasser; Colonel Richard K. Jacobson, the director of Thor; and
Colonel Benjamin P. Blasingame, the director of Titan; and presented
each a figurine. He admonished, "I don't want to see these figures
again until you each have a successful launch. Put these sad little men
on your desks to remind you that we have a schedule to meet."13
Not to be outdone, when Glasser and the other two directors achieved
successful launches, they returned the figurines, wearing silver halos,
to Schriever.14
General Glasser and his fellow staff members at WDD responded
to General Schriever's methods of communication and leadership by
toiling hard. Glasser noted:
He [General Schriever] is the kind of ... person who ...
attracts people. You like to work for him ... We worked enormous hours.
You cannot imagine. His theory was, "How can we convince people this
[the ballistic missile program] is the country's highest priority
program if we're going to knock off for the weekend?" .... I've
forgotten the length of the day, but it wasn't an eight-hour day. I
think it was a ten-hour day .... six days a week .... Sunday you were
back ... because you couldn't get done .... This went on, not just for
six months or so, but this went on for years. Yet, I don't ever
remember anybody grumbling .... for the first couple of years we were
secretly living in a civilian community in civilian clothes. We had a
little California-style hot dog shop across from the schoolhouse where
we were housed [offices located] that was popularly known as the
"Officers' Club." It had a couple of redwood tables and people would go
over there and get a hot dog.
. . . Schriever was able to build a camaraderie . . . that
got everybody focused on the chore.... He was an expert politician and
. . . planner.15
General Glasser observed that morale at the space program in
Los Angeles and the Air Force at large was high:
when people know what they are doing is worthwhile .... give
a guy something makes sense to him and he will bust his butt to get it
done.16
Certainly, General Schriever motivated his people. He
conveyed to them the utter sense of importance with which he viewed the
Thor, Atlas, and Titan programs.
At the same time, he was alert to new possibilities. In early
1957, he deemed that the time was ripe for the inauguration of a
solid-propellant missile program. Accordingly, Schriever sent the
personable and persuasive Glasser as his emissary to Washington to sell
this idea to Secretary of the Air Force, Donald A. Quarles. Quarles
wanted the Thor, Atlas, and Titan programs operational before the Air
Force began any new missile programs. Nonetheless, though he was
resistive, General Glasser convinced him to permit the start of a
solid-propellant missile "technology program." A year later, the Air
Force was able to initiate the solid-propellant Minuteman ICBM program.17
Glasser, himself, stayed with the Minuteman program only long
enough, from October 1958 to September 1959, to organize it, contract
it out, and arrange a schedule for it. He then turned the program over
to Colonel (later General) Samuel C. Phillips.18
General Glasser remembered that, after Sputnik, funding for
the US's space program was plentiful. He remarked that it was
"interesting that all you had to do was to have Sputnik go up and
everybody's perspective just flip-flopped." However, General Glasser
questioned just how much the injection of money into space programs
could accelerate them.19
In October 1959, the Air Force reassigned General Glasser to
Headquarters ARDC. He served first as the Chief, Ballistic Missiles and
Space Systems Division, and later as the Assistant Deputy Chief of
Staff, Research and Engineering. In February 1961, he became the
Special Assistant to the Commander, ARDC, with the additional duty as
the Chief of the Command Special Projects Office.20
During this period, General Glasser worked on the
reorganization of the Air Research and Development Command and the Air
Materiel Command (AMC). He participated in a study group organized in
1959 by General Curtis E. LeMay's Systems Management Group. Glasser's
study group reached the conclusion that the Air Force should never have
created the two separate commands, ARDC and AMC, and that it should
rejoin them. But the study group recognized that the time was not
propitious for this. It recommended gradual accomplishment of this
merger.
But when Robert S. McNamara became Secretary of Defense in
1961, he urged the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen Thomas D.
White, to reorganize the Air Force's systems management immediately so
that McNamara could assign the military space program to the Air Force.
After consultation with General Schriever, General White chose General
Glasser, who was already familiar with the issue, to study and
recommend, more or less on his own, a method for reorganizing the Air
Force's systems management. White directed Glasser to accomplish this
task discreetly since the issue was fraught with controversy. As a
result of Glasser's work, the Air Force established Air Force Systems
Command and Air Force Logistics Command. Air Force Systems Command
assumed single integrated management of the total weapon system
process, including development and acquisition, and AFLC the
responsibility for the logistical support of weapons systems.21
In July 1962, General Glasser became the Vice Commander of
the Electronic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command. He remained
in this capacity until July 1965, when he moved to the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, HQ USAF; first as the
Deputy Director of Operational Requirements and Development Plans, and
then as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development.
In February 1970, General Glasser assumed the responsibility of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, HQ USAF, with
additional duty as the Military Director of the USAF Scientific
Advisory Board.22
As the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and
Development, General Glasser involved himself in the evaluation of
fatigue problems experienced by the F-111 which restricted its flight.
A modified wing carrythrough box solved the problem. General Glasser
then announced that the Air Force was lifting operating restrictions on
those F-111s modified with the new wing box.23
In his final position, as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Research
and Development, General Glasser was again intimately involved with the
Minuteman. He oversaw the development of an improved third stage and
post boost propulsion system which provided the Minuteman III with the
capability to carry Mark 12 multiple reentry vehicles together with
their related penetration aids. He also supervised the systems
integration and testing, and guidance and control support, and oversaw
post-boost propulsion system testing, and in-place and in-flight
hardness testing for the Minuteman III. He participated in the effort
to develop improved command and control of the Minuteman force. This
effort included exploration of a system which would allow retargeting
of the Minuteman force at the launch control facility. The program used
advanced guidance and post-boost vehicle technology.24
General Glasser strove to acquaint himself with the technical
details of the programs with which he was associated. When he came back
to the Pentagon as the Deputy Director of Operational Requirements, DCS
Research and Development, he found himself with ample time to immerse
himself in new military technologies--e.g. doppler radars, turbine
machinery, and lasers. After providing his secretary with a list of
technologies with which he felt uncomfortable, he divulged, "I know we
have guys on the staff . . . who are experts in each . . . and I want
you to get the best guy to . . . give me lectures, [and] have
discussion periods."25 For a couple of years, General
Glasser continued this process. He related: "I would have some guy . .
. go through all of the intricacies of turbine engines and the
differences between fans ... [and] straight pipes.... I learned a hell
of a lot .... The result was that--[in] ... briefings ... I was ... an
annoying bastard that would insist on getting straight answers."26
General Glasser admitted that he was not "totally expert" in such
matters, but maintained that he at least had a "smattering of
ignorance" that enabled him to understand underlying technical issues
so that he "could detect . . . some guy['s] trying to run one" by the
staff.27
General Glasser retired from active duty on 1 August 1973.
From 1973 to 1976, he served as the Vice President of the International
Office of the General Dynamics Corporation in St. Louis; from 1976 to
1985, he held the same position when the office was located in
Washington D.C.; and from 1985 to 1986 he served as Vice President for
Government Relations for the General Dynamics Corporation in Washington
D.C. He retired from General Dynamics in 1986.28 Currently,
he resides in Sarasota, Florida.29
1 Biography, Office of Information,
"Lieutenant General Otto J. Glasser, 15 July 1971 , p. 1.
2 Interview, US Air Force Oral History
Program, Lt Col John J. Allen, USAF, with Lt Gen Otto J. Glasser
(ret.), USAF, 5-6 January 1984, p. 37.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
5 Ibid., p. 42.
6 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
7 Biography, Office of Information,
"Lieutenant General Otto J. Glasser, 15 July 1 971 , p. 3.
8 Book, Shirley Thomas, Men of
Space: Profiles of Leaders in Space Research, Development, and
Exploration, Vol. 1, "Bernard A. Schriever," p. 57.
9 Article, Colonel Otto J. Glasser,
"Atlas ICBM Weapon System," Air Force Magazine, April 1958,
pp. 72, 74.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 74.
12 Ibid., p. 72.
13 Book, Shirley Thomas, Men of
Space: Profiles of Leaders in Space Research. Development and
Exploration, Vol. 1, "Bernard A. Schriever," p. 63.
14 Ibid., p. 63.
15 Interview, US Air Force Oral History
Program, Lt Col John J. Allen, USAF, with Lt Gen Otto J. Glasser
(ret.), USAF, 5-6 January 1984, pp. 54-55.
16 Ibid., p. 63.
17 Ibid., pp. 67-69.
18 Ibid., p. 71.
19 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
20 Biography, Office of Information,
"Lieutenant General Otto J. Glasser, 15 July 1971,p. 1.
21 Interview, US Air Force Oral History
Program, Lt Col John J. Allen, USAF, with Lt Gen Otto J. Glasser
(ret.), USAF, 5-6 January 1984, pp. 93-105.
22 Biography, Office of Information,
"Lieutenant General Otto J. Glasser, 15 July 1971, pp. 1-2, 4.
23 Article, "Air Force Lifts F-111
Flight Restrictions," Armed Forces Journal, 12 July 1969, p.
19.
24 Article, Lt Gen Otto J. Glasser, "FY
1971 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force," Defense
Industry Bulletin, June 1970, p. 19.
25 Interview, US Air Force Oral History
Program, Lt Col John J. Allen, USAF, with Lt Gen Otto J. Glasser
(ret.), USAF, 5-6 January 1984, p. 70.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
28 Who's Who in America.
29 USAF Worldwide Locator.
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