Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2009 09:46:49 -0500
From: Francis Ridge <nicap@insightbb.com>
Subject: Re: SECRET letter re: 3 radar sightings in Japan 1947
To: RADCAT
From: Francis Ridge <nicap@insightbb.com>
Subject: Re: SECRET letter re: 3 radar sightings in Japan 1947
To: RADCAT
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MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF - 2
SUBJECT: Radar Pick-ups of High Speed Targets in the Far
East.
1. This recapitulation of three radar pick-ups of high
speed, targets in the Far East from 1 July 1947 to 16 September 1947
has been prepared to present graphically the targets and locations
reported, together with an estimated evaluation of this activity.
2. Paraphrased below are the incidents referred to with Air
Intelligence Division comments for each incident. Attached as Inclosure
1 to this memorandum is a map plotting the referenced incidents:
a. 1 July 1947
Source: GGA Unit, CHITOSE AAB, HOKKAIDO, JAPAN.
Speed: In excess of 500 mph. (435 knots) Altitude:
9000 ft. or higher.
Remarks; A target was picked up 16 miles north of the base
on a course of 180 degrees. (Point A'). The GCA unit immediately
called the tower and asked if any aircraft were operating north of the
field. At this instant of this radio transmission, the target reversed
course to 360 degrees and was tracked out to a range of 28 miles (Point
3'). The target then changed course to 240 degrees arid was tracked out
6 miles. (Point C') where it again reversed course to 060 degrees and
returned to the original point 28 miles north of the base (Point 3').
The target then changed course to 360 degrees and faded out of range
(Dotted line).
Comments; The nearest known operational U.S.S.R. air base to
the north of Chitose AAB is Otomari on southern Ostrov Sakhalin at a
range of 234 nautical miles from Chitose AAB. This base is classified
as having temporary runways of 4500 - 6000 foot length. Base contains a
large aviation gasoline tank farm with a pipe line to Korsakov Harbor
which is capable of handling tankers.
Headquarters of the U.S.S.R. Air Force on Karafuto is
located in the Toyohara area about 24 miles to the north of Otomari.
page 2 b. 28 August 1947
Source: MEW Radar Station, FUKUOKA, JAPAN.
Speed: 390-415 knots
Altitude: 1500 feet.
Remarks: A target was picked up in orbit at a range of 26-30
nautical miles on a bearing of.20 to 30 degrees (Point A). Target then
took a heading of 023 degrees and vvas tracked to a range of 54
nautical miles where it faded (Point3).The target was in a climb on
this outbound course and the weather at the time was such that the
climb would have to be made on instruments.
c. 16 September 1947
Source: MEW Radar Station, FUKUOKA, JAPAN.
Speed: 840 - 900
mph (730-780 knots)
Altitude: 10,000 - 20,000 feet.
Remarks: A target was picked up at a range
of 89 miles on a bearing of 040 degrees (Point C). Target was tracked
on an incoming course to a range of 19 miles and a bearing of 045
degrees (Point D) at which point it faded out.
Comments; The nearest known operational
U.S.S.R. air bases are on the east coast of Korea at 39° 10'
North Latitude and 127 degrees 29' East Longitude and Haeju on west
coast of Korea at 38° 02' North Latitude and 125 degrees East
Longtude. The range to these oases from Fukuoka is 360 nautical
miles. Genzan is classified as having permanent runways of 4500-6000
foot length, and was highly operational by the Japanese. Haeju
has one runway of approximtely 4000 foot length, probably surfaced. It
is therefore reasonable, to assume that the U.S.S.R. is utilizing the
facilities at these bases to the utmost, since the location is
strategically between Vladivostok to the north and the U.S. occupied
areas of Korea to the south. A recent report from the U.S. XXIV
Corps, evaluated F-3, states "a new type aircraft on Haeju airstrip
North Korea. "'This aircraft emitted black smoke on take-off, but was
not identified as jet propelled."
d. No U.S. aircraft were reported operating in the areas
where the targets were picked up.
3. Preliminary conclusions based on the above information
indicates:
a Great stress was given by the reporting agency to
the high degree of proficiency of the radar operators and controllers
in each caae. An operator of even moderate proficiency would have no
trouble in differentiating between a target and weather
phenomena. Frontal activity as seen °on a radar screen would
show depth while the reflection from a meteor exists for such a short
period of time that it would probably not be distinguishable from
static interference. Therefore, it appears that the incidents are
not due to natural phenomena.
page 3 b. In the case of the pick-up on 1 July 1947 it was
indicated as being more than one object. The size was comparable to
that of the response received from four P-51 type aircraft. When this
target initially reversed course at point A' it broke up into two
responses and then again merged into one large response on its outbound
course. The track of this target, if aircraft, could indicate a
photographic mission.
c. The sighting on 28 August 1947 was probably a
jet-propelled aircraft. Soviet jet aircraft are believed to have
performance sufficient for such a mission.
d. The speed indicated in the last report seems unreasonable
for piloted aircraft since it was well into the supersonic range. The
target, if an aircraft, would require an extremely large fuel supply
for this speed. If rocket propelled, it is hard to visualize its
operation for a long enough period of time to enable it to return to
its base. The cable report of this last sighting indicated that further
details, including weather, would follow. Upon receipt of this
information a better evaluation may be possible.
4. Present information does not permit a definite evaluation
that all objects reported were either aircraft or airborne missiles but
does support the conclusion that they were not natural phenomena.
JAMES F. OLIVE
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief, Air Intelligence Division
AC/S-2
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